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PARTICIPATION DECISIONS, ANGLER WELFARE, AND THE 
REGIONAL ECONOMIC IMPACT OF SPORTFISHING 
Keith R. Criddle, Mark Herrmann, S. Todd Lee, Charles Hamel 
ABSTRACT 
Data from a stated preference survey of anglers who fished in marine waters off the Kenai 
Peninsula, Alaska, are used to model angler participation, angler welfare, and regional economic 
activity. The probability of taking a sportfishing trip is represented as a nonlinear function of 
predictable or controllable trip attributes and demographic characteristics. Conditional individual 
probabilities are aggregated into estimates of total recreation demand and compensating variation 
using a simulation-based sample enumeration, weighted to reflect differences in participant 
motivation. A regionally adjusted zip code-level input-output model is used to represent the level 
of primary and secondary expenditures conditioned on participation. This approach results in a 
behaviorally based integrated model for exploring the changes in angler welfare and regional 
economic activity occasioned by changes in the demand for sportfishing that arise from changes in 
trip costs or the expected number, size, or mix of species caught. Because the model allows for 
nonlinear marginal utility, and substitution and complementary effects across attributes, participation 
rates, angler welfare, and the magnitude of regional economic activities exhibit nonlinear responses 
to variations in trip attributes. 
Key words: recreational demand, angler welfare, regional economic impacts 
PARTICIPATION DECISIONS, ANGLER WELFARE, AND THE 
REGIONAL ECONOMIC IMPACT OF SPORTFISHING* 
Introduction 
The marine sport fisheries of Lower and Central Cook Inlet, Alaska (Figure 1), support a large 
recreation based economic sector that provides non-monetary benefits to participants and pecuniary 
benefits to businesses and residents of the Kenai Peninsula region. Although this study focuses on 
the region's most important saltwater sports fishery, the fishery for Pacific halibut (Hippog/osus 
sten o/epis) , the marine sport fisheries for chinook (Oncorhynchus tshawytscha) and coho (0. 
kisutch) are treated as potential substitutes and complements for the halibut sport fishery. 
Pacific halibut are managed by an international agreement between the United States and 
Canada. Under the auspices of this agreement, the International Pacific Halibut Commission (IPHC) 
establishes constant exploitation yield (CEY) based harvest limits in the eastern North Pacific, Gulf 
of Alaska, and eastern Bering Sea. The authority to allocate catches among competing commercial, 
sport, and subsistence interests is delegated to the individual nations. The North Pacific Fishery 
Management Council (Council) is responsible for allocating halibut catches off Alaska. The 
commercial Total Allowable Catch (TAC) for Pacific halibut has been determined by subtracting 
a bycatch allowance and expected non-commercial (sport and subsistence) catches from the 
CEY-based harvest limit. However, as the share of halibut caught by sport fishers has increased, the 
Council has been lobbied to take actions to limit erosion of the commercial TAC. Growth of 
sportfishing catches has been particularly pronounced in the Central Gulf of Alaska Region (Prince 
William Sound, Resurrection Bay, Kodiak, Yakutat, and especially Cook Inlet and adj acent portions 
of the Gulf of Alaska) where sportfishing landings have grown from less than 2 percent of total 
removals (commercial, sport, and bycatch) in the late 1970s to over 18 percent in the mid-1990s. 
*Keith R. Criddle is a professor in the Department of Economics at Utah State University, e-mail: 
kcriddle@econ.usu.edu. Mark Herrmann is a professor in the Department of Economics at the University of Alaska 
Fairbanks, e-mail: ffmlh@uaf.edu. S. Todd Lee is an Industry Economist at the Alaska Fisheries Science Center, 
National Marine Fisheries Service, e-mail: Todd.Lee@noaa.gov. Charles Hamel is a research associate in the 
Department of Economics at the University of Alaska Fairbanks, e-mail: ffcdhl@uaf.edu. 
Partial funding for this project was provided by the University of Alaska Sea Grant College Program project 
98-403 R14-17 and from the Mineral Management Service through the University of Alaska Coastal Marine Institute 
project 12-35-0001-30661 task order 14196. The views expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily 
reflect those of their respective employers or the funding entities. 
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During the same period, Alaska resident sportfishing license sales increased 41 % (from about 122,000 to 
about 172,000 per year) and nonresident license sales increased 480% (from about 56,000 to about 
269,000 per year). In response to the intensified allocation conflicts between commercial and sport 
interests, the Council approved a management structure that sets a guideline harvest level (GHL) or cap 
for charterboat-based sportfishing catches of halibut equal to the 1995-1999 average catch with provisions 
for a reduction in the GHL if stock biomass declines (NPFMC 2000). Under the GHL, subsistence 
harvests and harvests by sport fishers who do not hire charterboat services will continue to be deducted 
from the commercial T AC. If approved by the Secretary of Commerce, the GHL will be implemented in 
2002. More recently, the Council has approved an individual fishing quota (IFQ) program for charter 
catches of halibut (NPFMC 2001). Under the proposed IFQ program, voluntary market transactions will 
allocate halibut within the charterboat sector and between commercial and charter operations. If approved 
by the Secretary of Commerce, the charter IFQ program will replace the GHL in 2003. 
The Data 
Data to support our analyses were obtained using a postal survey of 4,000 anglers who purchased an 
Alaskan license in 1997 (Herrmann et al. 2001 b) and through onsite interviews conducted with local 
government officials and business community members (Herrmann et al. 2001a). The angler survey 
solicited demographic information, information about expenditures incurred during and attributes of 
recent sportfishing trips taken in Lower or Central Cook Inlet, and asked respondents to state their 
preferences with respect to hypothetical trips. The survey data were used to develop a statistical model of 
individual participation decisions. The model provided a basis for estimating total demand and angler net 
benefits. The interviews and secondary data were combined with information from the survey to update 
the input-output model technical coefficients and to disaggregate sportfishing from other sectors in the 
input-output model. The angler survey elicited an overall response rate of 70.08% on delivered surveys. 
Baseline estimates of total expenditures were calculated using information from the survey in 
combination with Alaska Department of Fish and Game (Howe et al. 1998) estimates of total angler days. 
Survey respondents were asked to provide detailed information regarding expenses incurred on their 
most recent salmon and halibut fishing trips. These expenditures included transportation and lodging as 
well as fishing expenditures. Non-residents spent an average of $294.21 per charter-based sportfishing-
day: $103.87 in transportation and living expenses and $190.34 in fishing expenses. Nonresident fishing 
expenditures included charter fees ($140.75) and fish processing charges ($32.72). Alaska residents from 
outside the Kenai Peninsula Borough spent an average of $204.91 per charter-based sportfishing-day. 
Locals (Kenai Peninsula Borough residents) averaged $167.47 in fishing expenditures per day of charter-
based fishing. The average cost-per-day for charter-based sportfishing trips was 64% higher than the 
average for trips taken on private vessels. 
The total number of angler-days fished in Lower and Central Cook Inlet during 1997 was 197,556 
(Howe et al. 1998). The distribution of sportfishing effort across fishing modes and residency categories 
is reported in Table 1. In order to isolate the monetary effects of changes in participation in Lower and 
Central Cook Inlet marine sport fisheries, it is important to focus only on expenditures that are directly 
attributable to those fisheries. Because marine sportfishing was not a primary motivation for trips taken 
by some survey respondents, it would be inappropriate to attribute all of the trip expenses to the existence 
of marine sportfishing opportunities. Expenditure estimates were therefore adjusted downwards using 
data on trip purpose from the survey. The total spending directly attributable to the fishing component of 
trips taken in 1997 (i.e., money that would not have been spent if the fishing component was cancelled) 
was estimated to have been $34.1 million, $28.5 million of which was spent on the Kenai (Tables 2 and 
3). Because it is assumed that local residents will substitute spending on other regional recreational 
activities for their foregone sportfishing expenditures, their expenditures ($3.5 million) were deducted. 
The $25.0 million remainder reflects an infusion of spending on the Kenai Peninsula that would not have 
occurred in the absence of marine sportfishing opportunities in Lower and Central Cook Inlet (Table 4). 
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The adjusted 1997 expenditure data were used as a baseline in the regional economic model described 
below. 
Individual Participation Decisions, Total Demand, and Angler Welfare 
Changes in fishery regulations, environmental quality, and resource abundance, as well as trip costs, can 
affect the expected net benefit associated with sportfishing, and therefore the decision to participate in 
(take) a sportfishing trip. Consequently, the ability to forecast changes in participation rates is important 
in many policy settings. Previous studies have used demographic characteristics to explain changes in the 
demand for recreational fishing (Holland and Ditton 1992, Aas 1995, Thunberg et al. 1999). The 
disadvantage of these models is that the resulting forecasts are conditional on conjectures about 
demographic change. That is, such models shift the focus from forecasting changes in participation to 
predicting demographic change. Moreover, demography-based participation models are not suitable for 
predicting changes in the demand for recreational fishing that might arise in response to changes in trip 
costs, fishing conditions, or management actions. Our approach avoids these problems by focusing on 
explanatory variables that are predictable or subject to direct control. Consequently, our model is better 
suited for policy evaluation and for forecasting participation rate responses to changes in trip costs and 
catch rates. 
Survey respondents were presented a set of hypothetical fishing trips, and asked to identify which 
trips they would take. Each hypothetical trip was described in terms of six trip attributes and a cost per 
day. Hypothetical trip attributes were derived from historical means and pretest discussions with 
recreational fishers. The cost per day was identified as the sum of sportfishing related costs such as tackle 
and bait purchased specifically for the trip, charter/guide fees, and trip specific transportation costs such 
as auto and boat fuel. Respondents were offered trips at one of three cost levels ($100, $170, or $240 per 
day). The six non-pecuniary trip attributes were: one of four halibut catch (keep and release) levels (0, 2, 
4, 6 fish per trip); one of four average halibut weights (0, 20, 40, 80 lbs per fish); one of three chinook 
catch levels (0, 1, 2 fish per trip); one of four average chinook weights (0, 15, 25, 50 lbs per fish); one of 
four coho catch levels (0, 2, 4, 6 fish per trip); and one of two average coho weights (0, 7 lbs per fish). 
Trip-by-trip preferences were elicited through a binary choice variable that indicated whether the 
respondent would take a particular hypothetical trip. The advantage of this approach is that it is possible 
to construct an experimental design that allows for substitution and complementary effects across 
attributes, and for the possibility of nonlinear marginal utility. While these types of effects are predicted 
by economic theory, they are difficult to identify in empirical studies of actual trips because attributes are 
often highly collinear or lack sufficient variation. Based on projected survey returns and the need to 
conserve degrees of freedom, nine three-trip blocks (27 unique trips) wer~ selected for use in the survey. 
The blocks of hypothetical trips were selected to maximize the information content of the responses using 
the D-optimality criterion. Each of the 4,000 survey recipients was randomly assigned one of the nine 
blocks of three hypothetical trips. 
The participation decision, constructed using a random utility modeling framework, was modeled as a 
nonlinear function to allow for non-constant marginal utility, substitution, and complementarity across 
specIes: 
* T T T Yit =00 +a;~+~ f3~ +nt Ant +Zt Y 
T T T ~ Al A2 0 0 1 1 ~I ~2 0 0 irr:i YI 
l1{* ~I ~ fin 0 ~ 0 0 0 0 0 1 s£x· Y2 ' (1) =oo+a;~+ ~l ~2 ~3 ~ l1{* + 0 0 0 0 
+ I 
11f 0 0 ag~ Y3 
-
0 0 0 0 0 11f 0 0 0 0 0 0 edui Y4 
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* where the binary variable Yit was assigned a value of 1 when survey respondent indicated that she 
would take trip t and 0 otherwise; ~, ni, and wi , are hypothetical attributes that denote the total cost of 
taking trip t and the number and total weight of species s caught on trip t, respectively; halibut, 
chinook, and coho are denoted h, ch, and co , respectively; and, inci, sexi, agei , and edui are the 
household income, gender, age, and education level reported by individual i . The coefficient matrices ex , 
{3, A, and " and a random effects parameter p were estimated simultaneously for resident and 
nonresident respondents using a random effects probit procedure. The data and coefficient matrices are 
partitioned to emphasize components responsible for representing linear and quadratic factors. To ensure 
that the participation decisions were grounded in recent experience, coefficient estimation was based on 
the 352 surveys returned by respondents who took at least one salmon or halibut sportfishing trip in 
marine waters off the Kenai Peninsula during 1997. Each respondent answered questions regarding three 
different hypothetical trips, yielding a total of 1,056 observations. 
Coefficient estimates are reported in Table 5. The random effect parameter, p, is statistically 
different from zero at the 99% level (p = 0.0057), confinning the presence of a random effect. The point 
estimates of the parameters accord well with economic theory: the price coefficient is negative; the 
coefficients on total halibut, chinook salmon, and coho salmon weights and halibut catches are positive; 
coefficients on the quadratic tenns and cross products are negative, implying that recreational fishers 
experience decreasing marginal utility and that catches of each species are substitutes for catches of the 
others; and, the probability of taking a trip increases as a function of income, age, and education, and is 
higher for males. Overall model perfonnance was good: the log likelihood at convergence is -542.503 and 
-731.047 when the parameters were set to zero; and R2 is 0.442.1 
The conditional individual participation probabilities are aggregated into estimates of total demand 
using a simulation-based sample enumeration method that takes into account differences in demographic 
characteristics and variability in the number of days fished per year by developing forecasts for each 
individual in the sample (see e.g., BenAkiva and Lennan 1987). Because the point estimates of 
percentage changes in the number of sportfishing-days are highly nonlinear, a Monte Carlo procedure 
based on 10,000 draws was used to estimate 90% confidence intervals (see e.g., Krinsky and Robb 1996). 
Following Hanemann (1999), conditional estimates of angler welfare were calculated from the estimated 
participation rate model as the product of the weighted average compensating variation per trip taken and 
the total number of angler-days spent fishing for salmon and halibut in Lower or Central Cook Inlet. (See 
Herrmann et a1. · (2001a) for a detailed development of these estimates.) The estimated average daily 
compensating variation is $80.83 for Alaskans and $118.88 for nonresidents (Table 6). Total 
compensating variation is $19.2 million ($10.3 million for nonresidents and $8.9 million for residents). 
Every change that affects sportfishing trip attributes affects the average sport fisher's decision to 
participate, regardless of whether the attribute change is due to changes in the cost of a sportfishing trip, 
natural population fluctuations, regulatory change, or environmental damage. Changes in the probability 
of individual participation lead to shifts in the total demand for sportfishing trips and to changes in angler 
welfare. 
I The log-likelihood at convergence is the value of the log-likelihood function evaluated at the parameter values we report. These 
are the parameter values that maximize the log-likelihood function and were found by using a numerical optimization algorithm. 
Our estimate of R} follows Yeall and Zimmerman (1996): 
R2 (LLm-L~) / -2 L~ 
(LLm-L4J+N) (N-2L4J) ' 
where LLm is the value of the log-likelihood function from the model, and L4J is the value of the log-likelihood function with all 
of the slope coefficients set at zero., and N is the total number of observations. 
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Regional Impact Analysis 
While economic efficiency (i.e., consumer surplus for anglers and producer surplus for charter operators) 
is a standard objective identified by economists, the Magnuson-Stevens Act places importance on both 
efficiency and equity issues when managing the nation's fisheries (US Department of Commerce 1996). 
Recent litigations involving fisheries have also stressed distributional issues (e.g., Northern Economics 
1990, MAP 1992, Cohen 1993). Economic impact analysis provides a snapshot of the economic 
interdependencies of various industries in a regional economy, and therefore allows analysts to model the 
downstream effects of demand changes for commodities or services. Since opportunity costs and 
willingness to pay do not enter into the impact assessment framework, the results of an economic impact 
analysis should not be confused with statements of value. It should be noted, however, that the results that 
yield the greatest value under a net benefit analysis might at times imply very disproportional allocations 
among stakeholders. Because notions of fairness and equity do not enter into the standard net benefits 
framework, economic impact analyses are useful tools for tracking and identifying impacts, in revenue, 
income and employment terms, of alternative policies. For a more detailed discussion on the differences 
and appropriate uses of cost-benefit and economic impact analyses, see Edwards (1990) and Steinback 
(1999). 
To model the regional impact of the sports fishery on the Kenai Peninsula we selected IMPLAN. 
(Olson and Lindall 1997), the most commonly used 1-0 model, as a base for our model. IMPLAN 
includes 21 economic and demographic variables for 528 industrial sectors for all US counties (and 
boroughs). Although the national level data are regularly updated, these updates are not necessarily 
apportioned accurately across the various regional data sets. Moreover, regions may have unique 
economic sectors or linkages that are not well represented in IMPLAN. Consequently, in regions such as 
Alaska, where the small numbers of firms creates frequent disclosure problems, and where the economy 
is rapidly evolving and heavily resource dependent, it is particularly essential that the transaction 
coefficients be thoroughly updated and carefully groundtruthed with local data and expert knowledge. 
Because the sportfishing sector is not explicitly represented in IMPLAN, we developed a 
programming module that disaggregates IMPLAN sectors that include recreation related activities to 
identify those activities generated by sportfishing. This module utilizes IMPLAN generated response 
coefficients and secondary regional economic data as inputs in model formulation. The secondary model 
data is augmented with data for the target sectors (e.g., sport/charter industry) supplied by primary data 
collection. Thus the sportfishing module, through its 1-0 framework, explicitly accounts for linkages 
between various economic sectors, according to production and consumption patterns. (See Hermann et 
al. 2001 a for a detailed description of the development of this model.) 
In contrast to manufacturing sectors, which are well represented in IMPLAN, retail sectors are highly 
aggregated. Bushnell and Hyle (1985), Wolsky (1984), and Gillen and Guccione (1990) suggest 
approaches that directly modify the technical coefficients matrix. This requires reprogramming of 
IMPLAN's social accounting matrices to reflect the characteristics of the dis aggregated subsector. By 
including the new sector within the model, the changes are noted within the use (absorption), byproducts, 
and final demand matrices. Regional purchase coefficients and value added features are likewise 
constructed for the new sector. We used the first approach to represent charter operations and the second 
to represent expenditures by sport fishers. 
Individual sportfishing activities are accommodated differently from direct income generating 
activities such as guiding, harvesting, and processing. Individual sportfishing activities are accounted for 
by expenditure patterns in retail and service sectors, rather than treated as an identifiable economic sector. 
The recreational fishing module allocates recreational expenditures among these sectors. A model of the 
average charter operation's purchasing pattern was constructed using data obtained by NPFMC (2000) as 
well as discussions with local experts and members of industry during fieldwork conducted for this study. 
Standard Industrial Classification codes for the corresponding inputs were translated to the IMPLAN 
sectoral scheme and a production function was estimated for the 1997 charter sector sales value of $13.6 
million. (For a detailed accounting of the individual expense categories, corresponding Standard 
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Industrial Classification codes and translation to the IMPLAN sectoral scheme, the reader is referred to 
Herrmann et al. 2001a). For the other expenditure categories impact scenarios were run in IMPLAN to 
generated response coefficients. These response coefficients and those developed for the charter sector 
were linked in a stand-alone recreational module (Hamel et al. 2001). 
Simulation Results and Analysis 
The integrated model can be used to explore the effect of variation in trip attributes on angler welfare and 
regional economic activity. Although the model was developed, in part, to meet the needs of 
environmental and regulatory impact analyses related to outer continental shelf minerals exploration, 
development and production activities in the Cook Inlet Planning Area (Herrmann et al. 2001a), 
preliminary model results have also been used in regulatory analyses related to recent management 
actions designed to constrain the expansion of charter-based sportfishing for halibut and analyses related 
to the possible adoption of individual fishing quotas for charter-based halibut catches (NPFMC 2000, 
2001). 
Changes in the probability that the average sport fisher will take a trip are estimated using the 
parameter estimated from the probit model and aggregated into predictions of changes in total 
sportfishing effort and used to predict changes in angler welfare and regional economic impacts. Figure 2 
depicts changes in the probability that an average sport fisher would take a sportfishing trip as a function 
of percentage changes in the expected catch of halibut. The changes in participation show a declining 
marginal utility of catch and that Alaskans are more sensitive than nonresidents to changes in expected 
catch. Reductions (increases) in expected catch reduce (increase) the compensating variation in two ways. 
First, the marginal sport fisher will drop out (enter) of the fishery as the expected benefits (in terms of 
catch) decrease (increase), thereby decreasing (increasing) the total net benefits of the fishery. Second, the 
net benefit of taking a trip is also reduced (increased) for all the sport fishers who continue to participate 
because each trip produces less (more) net benefit when the catch rate declines (increases). 
The relationship between total angler welfare and changes in catch is represented in Figure 3. The 
total net benefits that accrue to Alaskan anglers are more responsive to changes in expected catch than are 
those obtained by nonresidents. Nevertheless, a 30% reduction in expected catch would reduce total 
compensating variation to about one-half the 1997 resident and nonresident baseline levels. Resident and 
nonresident angler net benefits alike would be all but eliminated if the expected catch fell by more than 
50%. Changes in halibut abundance or management policies that increase expected halibut catch-per-day 
by 30% could be expected to increase angler net benefits by $5.8 and $3.6 million for residents and 
nonresidents, respectively. 
Unlike angler net benefits, which are a measure of economic efficiency, impact analysis is a measure 
of distribution. That is, changes in average daily compensating variation affect regional economic activity 
when they lead to changes in the total number of sportfishing-days. Furthermore, the net regional impact 
is limited to those recreators who do not substitute other types of expenditures on the Kenai Peninsula in 
lieu of expenditures that they would have made if they had gone fishing. Assessment of the regional 
economic impacts of marine sportfishing on the Kenai Peninsula Borough begins with a baseline of 
expenditures that fluctuates as sport fisher behavior responds to changes in fishing conditions. Table 4 
breaks out the $25 million of "new" money to the region spent by non-local Alaskans and nonresidents 
($15.3 million of fishing related expenses and $9.7 million of other expenses). Changes in expected 
angler success (catch) affect participation decisions and, consequently, angler expenditures, industry 
output, personal income, and employment. The magnitude of these effects are reported in Table 7 and 
represented in Figures 4-7. The results indicate, for example, that for a 10% decrease in expected halibut 
catches, net benefits to resident and nonresident sport fishers will decrease by $3.7 million. The regional 
impacts include a $2.1 million decrease of direct, indirect, and induced output expenditures in the Kenai 
Peninsula region, which will result in a decrease of $0.9 million in personal expenditures and a loss of 59 
jobs. For a 10% increase in expected halibut catch-per-day, net benefits to sport fishers will increase by 
$3.5 million and there will be a $1.5 million increase of direct, indirect, and induced output expenditures 
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in the Kenai Peninsula region, which will result in an increase of $0.6 million in personal expenditures 
and an increase of 44 jobs. In the case of all impacts, the higher the catch rates the smaller the marginal 
change in impact. This is due to the fact that there is a declining marginal value of additional fish catches 
and, therefore, the change in participation rates diminishes as the catch rates increase and vice versa. 
Angler net benefits and regional economic impacts are also affected by changes in trip costs. Trip 
costs might increase as a result of increased license fees, as an unintended consequence of management 
actions taken to limit halibut sportfishing catches, or other changes in the supply of or demand for trips. 
Figure 8 illustrates that the number of angler-days fished by Alaskans is more sensitive to trip cost 
increases than is the number of angler-days fished by nonresidents. Consequently, if fishery managers 
seek to limit sportfishing catches through an equal increase in resident and nonresident license fees, the 
percent reduction in trips taken by Alaskans will be larger than the percent reduction in trips taken by 
nonresidents. Alternatively, if managers wanted to achieve identical percent reductions in resident and 
nonresident trips, they could impose a larger fee increase on nonresidents than they impose on residents. 
Moreover, if managers were strictly concerned with benefits to Alaskan resident anglers and were 
concerned that the imposition of a binding GHL might lead to increases in the cost of charter trips, they 
could select a nonresident license fee that would induce a reduction in nonresident demand sufficient to 
choke off any upward pressure on charter trip prices. It should be noted that such fees would need to be 
based on the number of days fished or the number of fish caught. No such fees currently exist for halibut 
sportfishing in Alaska and the authors do not necessarily advocate the creation of such fees. The regional 
economic impacts of changes in trip costs are reported in Table 8 and Figures 9-11. Note that although 
participation is a linear function of trip cost, angler welfare and regional economic activity are nonlinear. 
The results indicate, for example, that for a $10 increase in expected trip costs, the number of angler-days 
fished will decline by 7,174, net benefits to sport fishers will decrease by $2.2 million, sportfishing 
related expenditures in the Kenai Peninsula region will fall by $1.2 million, Kenai Peninsula Borough 
personal income will decline by $0.5 million, and there will be a loss of 33 jobs. 
In the participation model, when estimating the changes in the probability that individual fishers 
would take a trip, given varying trip attributes, it is assumed that the price of the trip will remain constant 
at P. In other words, we assume that supply is perfectly elastic. While this assumption is appropriate for 
shore and private trips, it is probably not entirely accurate for the charter sector. To the extent that charter 
trips make up a sizeable portion of sportfishing effort, and to the extent that charter trips do not exhibit 
perfectly elastic supply curves, there may be price adjustment especially in the short-run. For example, 
charter operators might respond to a short-run change in expected catches by lowering their prices and 
keeping their customer base rather than holding prices constant and losing customers as assumed in our 
model. While our assumption is valid in the long run, it may be somewhat unrealistic in the short run. (If 
there is an upward sloping supply curve for charters then there would still be a loss in surplus associated 
with the charter industry when there is an environmental change; however, some of the surplus would 
come from producers instead of the consumers.) Additionally, if price were lowered to maintain the 
current level of participation, there would be little regional impact outside of fish processing. Therefore, 
for the charter industry, our results more closely reflect long-run results than short-run results especially 
with respect to income distribution. For shore and private vessels this is not a factor. 
Conclusions 
This study develops estimates of the net economic benefits that accrue to participants in the Lower and 
Central Cook Inlet halibut sport fisheries, the relationship between catch, size of catch, and the number of 
sportfishing days, and the regional (Kenai Peninsula area) economic impact of changes in the annual total 
number of person-days fished. The integrated model is used to explore changes in net benefits and 
changes in regional impacts associated with changes in trip costs and angler success. Changes in expected 
catch could result from predictable changes in stock abundance, conditionally predictable environmental 
damages resulting from minerals exploration, development, production, or transportation activities, or 
from controllable management actions that affect the allocation between commercial, subsistence, and 
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sport fishers, bag and possession limits, fishing methods, or other measures that affect average catches. 
Changes in cost might arise as a result of predictable shifts in the demand for sportfishing, as the result of 
deliberate management actions such as changes in resident or nonresident license fees, stamps or 
endorsements, or incidental to management actions such as the GHL or charter IFQ which may affect the 
supply or character of sportfishing trips. 
The advantage of our integrated model is that changes in participation are determined by variables 
that are observable, predictable, or subject to management control; that nonlinear preferences are easily 
accommodated; that aggregation of the individual participation probabilities provides a method for 
estimating angler welfare; and, that estimated changes in aggregate participation can be linked to a 
regional input-output model to provide estimates of the regional economic impacts of changes in trip 
attributes. Although the model was developed, in part, to meet the needs of environmental and regulatory 
impact analyses related to outer continental shelf minerals exploration, development and production 
activities in the Cook Inlet Planning Area (Herrmann et al. 2001a), preliminary model results have also 
been used in regulatory analyses related to recent management actions designed to constrain the 
uncompensated reallocation of halibut from the commercial fishery to the charter-based sport fishery 
(NPFMC 2000, 2001). 
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Figure 1. Cook Inlet study area. 
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Figure 2. Percentage change in the probability that the average sport fisher will participate as a function 
of changes in expected halibut catch. The thick line represents the mean estimate. The thin lines represent 
upper and lower 90% confidence intervals. 
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Figure 3. The effect of changes in expected halibut catch on the magnitude. of total compensating 
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and Central Cook Inlet sport fisheries. 
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Figure 5. Industry output impacts from changes in expected catches of halibut in the Lower and Central 
Cook Inlet sport fisheries. 
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Figure 6: Personal income impacts from changes in expected catch of halibut in the Lower and Central 
Cook Inlet sport fisheries. 
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Figure 7: Employment impacts from changes in expected catch of halibut in the Lower and Central Cook 
Inlet sport fisheries. 
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Figure 8: Change in participation as a function of changes in the average cost of a sportfishing trip in the 
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$6 
c 
0 $4 :~ 
~ $2 > 
OJ) 
.§ C $0 
cd 0 C/) ._ 
c:::: 
-$2 Q) .-
0.. E EGA 
o '-' 
-$4 u 
.:: 
-$6 Q) 
OJ) 
c 
cd 
-$8 ..c 
u 
-$10 
-$20 -$10 $0 $10 $20 $30 $40 $50 
Change in Trip Cost 
Figure 9: Change in compensating variation as a function of changes in the average cost of a sportfishing 
trip in the Lower or Central Cook Inlet. 
C $4 V)c 
:::l 0 
:5 == $2 (/)~ ·E 
~V1 
.~ ~ $0 
-g § 
~.5 -$2 
w.l-
.... (\j 
~ ~ -$4 
<t:~ 
c: ~ .~ ~ -$6 
b.O ..... 
c: :::l 
~O 
U -$8 
-$20 
Criddle, Herrmann, Lee, and Hamel 
- - - - - - Personal Income 
-$10 $0 $10 $20 $30 $40 $50 
Change in Trip Cost 
Figure 10: Change in angler expenditures, gross sales (output), and personal income as functions of 
changes in the average cost of a sportfishing trip in the Lower or Central Cook Inlet. 
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Figure 11: Change in employment as a function of changes in the average cost of a sportfishing trip in 
the Lower or Central Cook Inlet. 
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Table 1 
Effort distribution (0/0) by residency category and sportfishing mode (Herrmann et al. 200 1 b). 
Charter Private Shore Total 
Local 3.8% 14.4% 6.5% 24. 7% 
Alaskan (non-local) 10.1 % 18.8% 2.4% 31.2% 
Nonresident 25.9% 13.0% 5.2% 44.0% 
Total 39 .8% 46.1 % 14.1% 100.0% 
Table 2 
Total expenditures by all sport fishers fishing for halibut and salmon in Lower and Central Cook Inlet that 
are directly attributable to the saltwater halibut and salmon fishing trip (Herrmann et al. 2001a). 
Days) Expenditures ($ million) 
Fishing (Kenai) Other (Kenai) Fishing (Alaska) Other (Alaska) Total 
Days Fished 197,556 
Days spent on Kenai 1 263,260 
Days spent in Alaska2 49,930 
Auto 
RV 
Lodge 
Groceries 
Restaurant & Bar 
Charter 
Gear 
Processing 
Derby 
Boat Fuel 
Haul 
Total 
i Includes days fished on the Kenai Peninsula. 
2 Excludes days spent on the Kenai Peninsula. 
2.620 
3.227 
2.864 
2.562 
10.367 
1.904 
2.307 
0.269 
1.732 
0.672 
17.252 11 .273 
0.074 
0.292 
0.366 
0.452 3.072 
2.698 2.698 
1.015 4.242 
0.517 3.381 
0.488 3.050 
10.367 
1.978 
2.307 
0.269 
2.024 
0.672 
5.170 34.061 
3 Days are the number of days spent that are attributable to the saltwater fishing portion of the trip. 
Table 3 
Expenditures attributable to sportfishing for halibut and salmon in Lower and Central Cook Inlet, by 
residency and sportfishing mode (Herrmann et al. 2001 b ). 
Fishing ($ million) Non-Fishing ($ million) Total ($ million) 
Residency 
Local 1.988 1.563 3.551 
Alaska 4.262 4.775 9.038 
Nonresident 11.367 10.1 05 21.472 
Total 17.618 16.443 34.061 
Fishing Mode 
Shore 0.361 1.771 2.131 
Private 3.915 4.885 8.800 
Charter 13.342 9.788 23.130 
Total 17.618 16.443 34.061 
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Table 4 
Total Kenai Peninsula area expenditures by Alaskans (non-local) and nonresidents that can be attributed 
directly to Lower and Central Cook Inlet halibut or salmon sportfishing trips (Herrmann et al. 200 1 b ). 
Auto fuel 
Auto/RV rentals 
Lodge 
Groceries 
Restaurant & Bar 
Charter 
Gear 
Processing 
Derby 
Boat Fuel 
Haul/moorage 
Total 
Table 5 
Expenditures ($ million) 
Fishing Expenditures Other Expenditures 
9.518 
1.659 
2.202 
0.171 
1.279 
0.433 
15.263 
2.208 
o 
3.061 
2.443 
1.997 
9.710 
Random effects probit model parameter estimates (Herrmann et al. 200 1 a). 
Alaskans (local and non-local) Nonresidents 
Estimates t-ratios Estimates t-ratios 
Intercept -2.8415 -3.03 -1.4746 -1.86 
Price -0.0124 -7.39 -0.0094 -6.96 
Total weight of halibut 0.0371 3.30 0.0228 2.53 
Total weight of chinook 0.1037 4.32 0.0732 3.56 
Total weight of coho 0.1242 2.95 0.1163 3.19 
Squared halibut weight -0.0001 -2.88 -0.0001 -1.33 
Squared chinook weight -0.0006 -3.41 -0.0004 -2.52 
Squared coho weight -0.0008 -1.13 -0.0011 -1.82 
Product of total weight of halibut and coho caught -0 .0005 -3.50 -0.0004 -3.20 
Product of total weight of halibut and chinook caught -0.0007 -2.84 -0.0005 -2.38 
Product of total weight oj chinook and coho caught -0.0018 -3.60 -0.0010 -2.26 
Number of halibut caught 1.1033 2.05 0.9241 2.33 
Squared number oj halibut caught -0.1492 -2.19 -0.1297 -2.52 
Per-Capita Household Income 0.0945 1.09 0.0021 0.04 
Gender (J =male) 0.3853 2.03 0.0963 0.57 
Age 0.0080 1.04 0.0003 0.05 
Education (J =college graduate) 0.2827 1.39 0.3853 2.49 
e 0.192 2.77 0.192 2.77 
Table 6 
Estimated compensating variation I. 
Residency Category 
Local 
Alaskan 
Nonresident 
Total 
Angler Days 
48,877 
61,709 
86,970 
197,556 
Mean 
80.83 
80.83 
118.88 
i See Herrmann et al 2001 a for confidence interval calculations. 
CV per Day ($) 
90% lower bound 
45 .75 
45.75 
84.90 
Total CV ($million) 
90% upper bound Mean 
121.63 3.927 
121.63 4.957 
157.22 10.339 
19.223 
The Value of Marine Sportfishing 
19 
Table 7 
Changes in compensating variation (CV) and regional economic impacts in response to changes in halibut 
catch. 
% Change in Change in Total CY Change in Output Change in Personal Change in 
% Chan~e in Catch ParticiEation ($ million) (Sales) ($ million) Income ($ million) EmElo~ment (Jobs) 
-50% -50.42 -16.191 -16.795 -7 .08 1 -488 
-40% -37.36 -13 .886 -12.210 -5 .150 -354 
-30% -25.36 -10.900 -8 .142 -3.346 -236 
-20% -15.04 -7.424 -4.750 -2.005 -137 
-10% -6.60 -3.709 -2.057 -0.868 -59 
3.51' 197,556 $19.2 $28.5 $12.034 822 
+10% 5.00 3.505 1.523 0.643 44 
+20% 8.69 6.662 2.260 1.107 75 
+30% 11.34 9.378 3.384 1.432 97 
I The values reported in this row are the baseline levels and are provided to add a relative context to the absolute changes. 
Table 8 
Changes in days fished and regional economic impacts in response to increases in the average cost of a 
sportfishing trip. 
Price 
$173 1 
+$5 
+$10 
+$15 
+$25 
+$50 
Days 
197,556 
-3,503 
-7,174 
-11,008 
-19,146 
-41,846 
Change in Total CY 
($ million) 
$19.2 
-1.12 
-2.21 
-3.26 
-5.28 
-9.68 
Change in Output 
(Sales) ($ million) 
$28.5 
-0.56 
-1.16 
-1.78 
-3.09 
-6.78 
Change in Personal 
Income ($ million) 
$12.034 
-0.24 
-0.49 
-0 .75 
-1.31 
-2.86 
Change in 
EmEloyment (Jobs) 
822 
-16 
-33 
-51 
-89 
-196 
I The values reported in this row are the baseline levels and are provided to add a relative context to the absolute changes. 
Participation Decisions, Angler Welfare, and the 
Regional Economic Impact of Sportfishing 
Keith R. Criddle, Mark Herrmann, S. Todd Lee, Charles Hamel 
Abstract. Data from a stated preference survey of anglers who fished in marine waters off the 
Kenai Peninsula, Alaska, are used to model angler participation, angler welfare, and regional 
economic activity. The probability of taking a sportfishing trip is represented as a nonlinear 
function of predictable or controllable trip attributes and demographic characteristics. 
Conditional individual probabilities are aggregated into estimates of total recreation demand and 
compensating variation using a simulation-based sample enumeration, weighted to reflect 
differences in participant motivation. A regionally-adjusted zip code-level input-output model is 
used to represent the level of primary and secondary expenditures conditioned on participation. 
This approach results in a behaviorally-based integrated model for exploring the changes in 
angler welfare and regional economic activity occasioned by changes in the demand for 
sportjishing that arise from changes in trip costs or the expected number, size, or mix of species 
caught. Because the model allows for non-linear marginal utility, and substitution and 
complementary effects across attributes, participation rates, angler welfare, and the magnitude of 
regional economic activities exhibit nonlinear responses to variations in trip attributes. 
Key words Recreational demand, angler welfare, regional economic impacts 
Introduction 
The marine sport fisheries of Lower and Central Cook Inlet, Alaska (Figure 1), support a large recreation 
based economic sector that provides non-monetary benefits to participants and pecuniary benefits to 
businesses and residents of the Kenai Peninsula region. Although this study focuses on the region's most 
important saltwater sports fishery, the fishery for Pacific halibut (Hippog/ossus steno/epis), the marine 
sport fisheries for chinook (Oncorhynchus tshawytscha) and coho (0. kisutch) are treated as potential . 
substitutes and complements for the halibut sport fishery. 
Pacific halibut are managed by an international agreement between the U.S. and Canada. Under the 
auspices of this agreement, the International Pacific Halibut Commission (IPHC) establishes constant 
exploitation yield (CEY) based harvest limits in the eastern North Pacific, Gulf of Alaska, and eastern 
Bering Sea. The authority to allocate catches among competing commercial, sport, and subsistence 
interests is delegated to the individual nations. The North Pacific Fishery Management Council (Council) 
is responsible for allocating halibut catches off Alaska. The commercial Total Allowable Catch (T AC) for 
Pacific halibut has been determined by subtracting a bycatch allowance and expected non-commercial 
(sport and subsistence) catches from the CEY-based harvest limit. However, as the share of halibut caught 
by sport fishers has increased, the Council has been lobbied to take actions to limit erosion of the 
commercial T AC. Growth of sportfishing catches has been particularly pronounced in the Central Gulf of 
Alaska Region (Prince William Sound, Resurrection Bay, Kodiak, Yakutat, and especially Cook Inlet and 
adjacent portions of the Gulf of Alaska) where sportfishing landings have grown from less than 2 percent 
of total removals (commercial, sport, and bycatch) in the late 1970's to over 18 percent in the mid 1990's. 
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